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Abstract
This paper presents evidence on the relationship between cyclical shocks and productivity
growth, for 20 2-digit SIC US manufacturing industries and a set of monetary policy, scal
policy, and oil price shocks. The paper uses as a measure of productivity change a Solow
residual corrected for a wide range of non-technological e¤ects due to imperfect-competition,
non-constant returns to scale, and cyclical utilization rates of capital and labor services. The
empirical framework identies policy shocks independently of productivity measurement issues
via a two-step procedure. While the typical industry shows weak responses of productivity
to the shocks considered, in some industries temporary contractionary policy shocks lead to
increases in productivity. In addition, the results reveal that there are localized asymmetries,
with contractionary policy shocks having larger produtivity e¤ects than their expansionary
counterparts. The results support the thesis that job reallocation is an important channel linking
contractionary policy shocks and productivity growth. These results support the pit-stop view
of downturns.
University of the Azores, Department of Economics and Management, 9501-801 Ponta Delgada, Portugal. E-mail:
menezesa@notes.uac.pt. I thank participants at seminars at Boston College, University of Alberta and Simon Fraser
University for helpful comments.
1
1 Introduction
Macroeconomic theory has traditionally neglected the e¤ects of cycles on productivity growth. Re-
cently, however, several papers in the endogenous growth literature have challenged this stance
and have proposed theories on the e¤ects of cycles on productivity growth. To date, the empirical
evidence is mixed and on balance inconclusive (Aghion and Howitt (1998, Ch. 8)). A characteriza-
tion of the literature on cycles and productivity growth as some stories, no facts, while somewhat
harsh, is on the mark. These developments, combined with recent advances in the measurement
of productivity, provide the impetus for renewed interest in empirical work on the relationship
between cycles and productivity growth. This paper studies the productivity e¤ects of a set of
cyclical shocks for 20 2-digit SIC US manufacturing industries, from 1972:2 to 1992:4. The paper
focuses on the arguments recently formalized by Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998).
Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) argue that some productivity improving activities are disruptive,
in the sense that rms must sacrice some output and prots to implement them. Hence, during
temporary demand downturns the opportunity cost of investing in such disruptive productivity
improving activities is lower and rms invest more in these activities, which results in productivity
growth. As a corollary of this reasoning, we follow the literature and use the label "Opportunity
Cost View" of recessions henceforth. Examples of such activities may include job reallocation,
managerial reorganizations, experimentation with new technologies, and training.
Some authors, namely Gali and Hammour (1992) and Saint-Paul (1993), have found empirical
evidence that supports such view of recessions. Gali and Hammour and Saint-Paul study the pro-
ductivity e¤ects of demand shocks by means of bivariate VARs, with productivity change measured
by the Solow residual and a cycle indicator, typically an employment rate. They identify demand
shocks as those shocks with no within-period e¤ect on productivity. Gali and Hammour use quar-
terly and annual data for the US manufacturing sector, while Saint-Paul uses aggregate annual
data for a sample of OECD countries. Both studies nd that a negative demand shock leads to an
increase in productivity. However, these pieces of evidence su¤er from important shortcomings that
stem from measurement of productivity, identication of the demand shocks, and interpretation
issues of the competing stories relating cycles and productivity growth.
On the measurement issues, studies like Basu et al. (1999) demonstrated that the Solow residual
is contaminated by non-technological e¤ects, which render it a polluted measure of productivity
growth. In addition, these non-technological e¤ects are highly correlated, both contemporaneously
and dynamically, with shocks to activity, and hence must be controlled for in studies of the re-
lationship between cyclical demand shocks and productivity growth. On the identication issues,
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the identifying restriction that it takes at least one period for the productivity improving activities
to have a noticeable impact on productivity is certainly ad-hoc and less defensible for annual data
than for quarterly data. More to the point, even if demand shocks have no within-period e¤ect on
true productivity, they may have on the Solow residual.
This paper tackles these issues heads on. First, it uses as measures of productivity change
Solow residuals corrected for all non-technological e¤ects believed to be of empirical importance
and investigates the robustness of the results for many alternative specications of productivity
change. Second, the identication of demand shocks is achieved independently of the measurement
of productivity. In addition, the demand shocks identied have concrete structural interpretations:
they are monetary policy and scal policy shocks. To achieve identication of monetary policy
shocks, the paper borrows from Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2000) and Romer and Romer
(1997), and of scal policy shocks from Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Perotti and Blanchard
(2002).
There are at least three reasons to focus on these shocks. First, for the Opportunity Cost View
to be e¤ective, the downturn in the demand that rms face has to be transitory since if permanent
then both the costs and benets of the productivity improving activities change in an equal manner,
leaving the optimal investment decision in these activities unchanged. Moreover, what matters is
whether rms perceive the downturn to be transitory or permanent. If rms correctly identify the
cause of the downturn as temporary and common to the entire economy, they may want to engage
in productivity improving activities to take advantage of the temporary slack before the economy
picks up again. This motivates us to use economy-wide shocks, such as policy shocks, and avoid
sectoral specic shocks, such as to relative prices, since it is more reasonable to argue that rms
expect the former to be temporary while the latter may be specic and permanent. Second, by
studying di¤erent demand shocks we can analyze the responses of the real interest rate and of
job reallocation to the di¤erent shocks, which according to the Opportunity Cost View, as argued
below, have a role in the relationship between cyclical demand shocks and productivity change.
Third, it may be of independent interest to analyze the productivity e¤ects of monetary policy and
scal policy shocks at the sectoral level. In this sense, this paper also provides further insight into
whether monetary and scal policy shocks have lasting real, productivity e¤ects.
On the interpretation issues, whereas the Opportunity Cost View predicts that temporary
contractionary shocks may have positive productivity e¤ects, learning-by-doing (Stadler (1990))
and capital market imperfections (Stiglitz (1993)) theories predict the opposite, which complicates
matters, since, ideally, empirical tests of the Opportunity Cost View ought to reveal its absolute
empirical relevance in addition to its relative empirical relevance vis à vis the competing theories.
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This point motivates the design of thorough and direct tests of the Opportunity Cost View. The
paper attempts to do this by looking at the roles of the real interest rate and of job reallocation,
and the distinct productivity e¤ects of shocks to demand and to supply conditions. In a companion
paper (Menezes (2004)), we extend the Aghion and Saint-Paul (1998) model and show that: (1)
supply shocks have no e¤ects on productivity growth; and (2) transitory demand downturns have
positive e¤ects only if the real interest rate is not too countercyclical. The rst result owes to the
fact that supply shocks matter essentially to intra-temporal decisions, and not to inter-temporal
decisions, such as the decision to invest in productivity improving activities. The second result
holds because if the real interest rate increases enough during transitory demand downturns, then
all investment activities decrease, regardless of their temporarily low opportunity cost. These
extensions are meaningful since they guide our empirical strategy, as discussed below.
The result that supply shocks have no e¤ects on productivity growth implies that we must
separate demand shocks from supply shocks, which, incidentally, we are not guaranteed to obtain
from simple VAR identication strategies, as pursued in Gali and Hammour and in Saint-Paul.
Also note that this result is in contrast to the competing theories which are silent with respect to
the demand vs. supply nature of the shocks. For this purpose, the paper uses as a measure of
supply shocks oil price shocks, following Hamilton (1985) and Davis and Haltiwanger (1999).
The second result, that the cyclicality of the real interest rate has a rst-order e¤ect on the main
implications of the Opportunity Cost View, motivates us to look at the joint behavior of di¤erent
demand shocks and of the real interest rate, because the Opportunity Cost View unambiguously
predicts that productivity growth is stronger after transitory demand downturns associated with
decreases in the real interest rate than after transitory demand downturns associated with increases
in the real interest rate. We pursue this line of investigation by considering di¤erent demand shocks.
Another novelty in the paper is the consideration that contractionary and expansionary de-
mand shocks may have di¤erent productivity e¤ects. In Aghion and Saint-Paul (1991), only con-
tractionary demand shocks have positive productivity e¤ects, while expansionary demand shocks
have no e¤ects on productivity at all. Note that this asymmetry is not predicted by the competing
theories, and, hence, looking at asymmetries constitutes a more thorough test of the Opportunity
Cost View and helps us with the interpretation issues. Finally, the paper investigates the empirical
role of job reallocation as a link between demand shocks and productivity growth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the framework used to measure productivity
change. Section 3 spells out the identication of the shocks and the estimation of the Impulse
Response Functions (IRFs) of productivity to these shocks. Section 4 documents and interprets
the main results. Section 5 o¤ers some nal remarks. The Appendix describes the data.
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2 Empirical Framework
2.1 Basic Strategy to Measure Productivity Growth
Under the Solow assumptions of competitive markets, constant returns to scale, proper measure-
ment of the inputs, and homogeneous production function, TFP growth and the Solow residual
coincide, with the Solow residual interpreted as a shift in the underlying production function.
However, and following the work by Hall (1990), a burgeoning literature vigorously demonstrated
that the Solow residual should not be interpreted as a pure measure of productivity change (Basu
et al. (1999)), unless proper account is taken of the non-technological e¤ects introduced into the
Solow residual by the violation of the Solow assumptions. More to the point, these non-technological
e¤ects are highly correlated with shocks to activity and hence cannot be treated as classical mea-
surement error in the context of this paper.
While there is no agreement in the literature on how to take account of these non-technological
e¤ects, there is wide agreement on the need to do so since the properties of the Solow residual
change in a dramatic fashion after one controls for varying rates of input utilization, non-constant
returns to scale, and imperfect competition in product markets. This literature has uncovered the
following stylized facts: the corrected Solow residual, when compared to its uncorrected counterpart,
displays lower implied probability of technological regress; lower volatility relative to output growth;
and lower contemporaneous correlation with input and output growth. In addition, the typical US
manufacturing industry exhibits constant or near constant returns to scale and a substantial amount
of factor hoarding during the cycle. These characteristics can be thought of as constraints that
must be satised by candidate measures of productivity change (King and Rebelo (1998), Burnside,
Rebelo, and Eichenbaum (1995) and Shapiro (1996))).
It seems desirable then to employ a correction framework that readily accommodates a wide
spectrum of non-technological e¤ects in the original Solow residual, regardless of their sources,
while leading to a corrected Solow residual in conformity with the ndings of other independent
studies.
Having the ability to study the e¤ects of the shocks of interest on productivity for each plausible
correction scheme allows one to ask: for which range of this spectrum of plausible corrections does
a particular result obtain? If the result obtains for the entire spectrum (all plausible corrections)
then one should regard this result as independent of the correction procedure. If the answer to a
particular question varies over this spectrum, then one has to integrate the di¤erent answers over
all parts of the spectrum, weighting them according to their empirical plausibility, albeit in an
informal manner.
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2.2 A Framework to Measure Productivity Growth
Each 2-digit SIC manufacturing sector is described by a production function of the form:
Yit = AitFi(itHitNit; UitKit) (1)
where Yit is real value added, Ait is an index of the state of technology and measures TFP, Nit
is labor employees, Hit is hours worked per labor employee, Kit is the capital stock, and Fi is a
homogeneous function of some degree i. Let Lit  HitNit be total labor hours worked. Firms may
change the contribution of the inputs in the short run by varying the utilization rates of labor and
capital services, it and Uit, respectively.
Hall (1990) assumes that the rm solves a cost minimization problem and derives TFP growth
rate:
dait = dyit   i[it(dlit + dit) + (1  (it=i)it)(dkit + duit)] (2)
where x  lnX, it is the markup ratio, and it is the share of total revenue that accrues to labor
services. Equation (2) involves the unobserved series dit, duit, it, and parameter i. To render
(2) operational we employ proxies for the series dit and duit and allow the parameter i and series
it to vary within a reasonable range (discussed below).
The studies that have used proxies for duit considered data on electricity consumption (Burnside
et al. (1995)), shift work (Shapiro (1996)), workweek of capital (Shapiro (1996)), and functions of
labor variables (Evans (1992)). We follow Burnside et al. (1995) and assume dkit + duit  deit,
where deit is the growth rate of industrial electricity consumption. Note that deit should capture
all intensive margins of adjustment that rms may have at their reach when trying to vary the
contribution of capital services; that hoarding of electricity does not pose a problem; that the sectors
covered on the empirical exercises presented in this paper are all manufacturing sectors, where this
assumption is a priori fairly innocuous; and that data on industrial electricity consumption are
available at the quarterly frequency.
For dit we follow Gordon (1990). Dene L

it  itLit as e¤ective labor services. Assume that
it is a variable stationary around one (say, e¤ort). Let ltrendit and l
trend
it be stationary deviations
from a common trend. Gordon assumes that a fraction 'i of the changes in l
trend
it takes the form
of changes in the labor utilization rate: it = 'il
trend
it . Hence, it = ('i=(1   'i)) ltrendit , and,
nally, dlit = dlit+ ('i=(1 'i))dltrendit . In practice we use micro evidence on 'i found in the work
of Fay and Medo¤ (1985) who report an average value of 'i equal to 0.21 for the US manufacturing
sector. However, we allow 'i to take on values f0; 0:1; 0:2; 0:3g, with the role of e¤ort increasing
in 'i. The trend term is obtained by applying the Hodrick-Prescott lter to measured hours, with
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 = 1600.
We let (it=i) vary between 1 and 1=it, where the lower bound follows from the second-order
condition for prot maximization and the upper bound from the imposition of nonnegative returns
on e¤ective capital services.1
As we try di¤erent TFP specications, we get di¤erent IRFs to each shock considered. Section
(4) discusses the sensitivity of the IRFs to the alternative specications of TFP. Here we focus on
the di¤erences in widely studied properties of the Solow residual brought about by changing the
TFP specication, as illustrated by Table 1 (where (x; y) is the correlation coe¢ cient between
x and y, and x is the standard deviation of x). For brevity, we focus on the typical industry,
reasonably represented by the aggregate manufacturing sector. Many other specications were also
considered, but the specications presented in Table 1 seem to encompass all the relevant ones.
Table 1
('i;i=i) = 0; 1 0; 1:2 0:1; 1 0:1; 1:2 0:2; 1 0:2; 1:2 0:3; 1 0:3; 1:2
Prob(dait < 0) 9:6% 9:6% 16:8% 13:2% 19:2% 19:2% 24:1% 25:3%
(dait; dyit) 0:20 0:15  0:00  0:09  0:23  0:33  0:43  0:52
(dait; dl

it)  0:12  0:19  0:32  0:43  0:53  0:64  0:70  0:78
da=dy 0:17 0:16 0:18 0:18 0:20 0:21 0:24 0:26
The columns on the far right of Table 1 suggest that increasing the correctionultimately leads
to residuals not in accordance with our priors about technological progress. As we further depart
from the original Solow residual case (('i;i=i) = (0; 1)), the residual becomes highly negatively
correlated with both output growth and labor input growth, and relatively more volatile, which,
combined with a virtually unchanged mean, explains the increase in the probability of technological
regress. Basu et al. (1999) using di¤erent data and methods obtain corrected residuals that exhibit
properties well in accordance with at least the rst four cases (from left to right). Note also
that increasing the markup to degree of returns to scale ratio above 1.2 implies shares of pure
economic prots in excess of 17%, which is bluntly at odds with Basu et al. (1999). Overall, these
1The assumption that it is constant over time is both needed, since we have no direct data on it, and quantitatively
innocuous. Suppose that the true markup ratio it equals i + vit. The discrepancy between 

it and it, vit, is
important to the extent that it may be dynamically correlated with the shocks of interest. Moreover, the di¤erence
between the true growth rate of TFP and the used one would then be:
vitit(dl

it   dkit)
which is likely to be fairly small, since in practice (dlit   dkit) is very small and does not cloud our conclusions.
7
results suggest that when interpreting the TFP responses, little weight should be given to TFP
specications similar to the ones on the far right of Table 1.
3 Identifying the Shocks
3.1 Basic Motivation
The empirical strategy used to study the dynamic impact of monetary and scal policy shocks on
TFP for each of the 20 2-digit SIC manufacturing sectors has the following two steps:
 First Step: The policy shocks common to all sectors are identied;
 Second Step: The IRF of TFP to these shocks is estimated for each sector.
Note that: 1) the rst step involves only economy-wide variables, guaranteeing that the re-
covered series for each policy shock considered is the same for all sectors; and 2) the di¤erent
specications proposed for the sectoral TFP indices are used only in the second step, and, hence,
the identied policy shocks are invariant with respect to the exact specication of the sectoral TFP
indices.
On reection, this is clearly as it should be. There are at least two reasons to adopt this two-
step procedure. First, if the policy shocks were identied from, say, a VAR that included TFP,
as in Gali and Hammour (1992) and Saint-Paul (1992), the policy shocks would then depend on
the specication of TFP. We nd this property unwelcome. From this VAR one could estimate
the IRF of TFP to a policy shock. If this exercise were repeated with a di¤erent specication of
TFP, and we have already established the need to perform sensitivity analysis to di¤erent TFP
specications, then new results would emerge. How should one interpret the new results? They
could be caused by the di¤erent specication of TFP, the di¤erent series of recovered policy shocks,
or both. This problem is avoided here since the identication of the policy shocks is decoupled from
the estimation of the IRFs of the sectoral TFP indices and from the uncertainty inherent in the
correct specication of these latter objects. Second, the two-step procedure allows the second-stage
estimation of the IRFs to be asymmetric with respect to positive and negative policy shocks, as
suggested by theory (see Section 1).
For the identication of the policy shocks (the proxy for demand shocks), the paper capitalizes
on the existing literature. Moreover, and to deal with the multitude of identication schemes put
forth in the literature, we employ identication schemes that, on the one hand, do not impose
unwelcome restrictions on the estimation of the IRFs, and, on the other hand, are widely viewed in
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the literature as well founded and agreed upon. This strategy is also employed in the identication
of the oil price shocks (the proxy for supply shocks), as discussed in the nal part of this section.
3.2 Monetary Policy Shocks
3.2.1 The Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2000) Approach
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans identify monetary policy shocks with the disturbance term st
in the monetary authoritys policy function rule:
St = f(
t) + 
s
t
The monetary authoritys operating instrument, St, is the sum of a reaction to current developments
in the economy, f(
t), and a discretionary policy shock, st . By specifying the information set
available to the monetary authority at time t, 
t, and imposing linearity of the function rule f , we
recover the policy shock st as the serially uncorrelated residual from an OLS regression of St on
the elements of 
t.
Given these identifying assumptions, the IRF of a variable xt to a monetary policy shock (st ) is
consistently estimated by regressing xt via OLS on current and lagged values of st . More formally:
xt = C(L)
s
t + vt
where C(L) is an innite order polynomial in non-negative powers of the lag-operator (in practice
truncated at the twentieth lag). It is assumed that all non-monetary policy shocks are subsumed in
vt, which is uncorrelated with st both contemporaneously and at all leads and lags. To investigate
the asymmetric e¤ects of contractionary and expansionary monetary policy shocks, the estimating
equation (for the IRF) becomes:
xt = C(L)
+s+t + C(L)
 s t + vt
where s+t  max(st ; 0) is a contractionary or tight shock, when the central bank target instrument
is an interest rate policy, and s t  min(st ; 0), an expansionary or easy shock.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans suggest the Federal Funds Rate as the monetary author-
itys operating instrument, or, alternatively, Non-Borrowed Reserves. We consider both operating
instruments and the following information set:

t = fQt  ; Pt  ; Ct  ; FFt  1; NBRt  1; TRt  1 :  = 0; 1; :::; 4g
where Q is the log Real GDP, P is the log of the GDP deator, C is the log of an index of sensitive
commodity prices (a leading indicator of ination), FF is the Federal Funds Rate, NBR is the log
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of Non-Borrowed Reserves, and TR is the log of Total Reserves. We compare our shocks with the
shocks identied by Garibaldi (1997), who follows Cover (1992) and get a correlation coe¢ cient of
0.82 (see Figure 1). Our results, discussed in the next section, based on Ft are, in this sense, robust
to the identication scheme.
3.2.2 Narrative Approach
We follow Romer and Romer (1997) who, from their reading of history, identify dates when the
Federal Reserve deliberately pursued a desinationary course of action.
To investigate the dynamic productivity e¤ects of contractionary monetary policy shocks iden-
tied via the narrative approach we estimate the following equation:
tfpit = ai;0 + ai;1  t+
8X
j=1
bi;jrrt j +
8X
j=1
ci;jtfpi;t j + i;t
where tfpit is the log of TFPit, and rrt is a 0/1 dummy variable that equals 1 when t equals:
1966:2, 1968:4, 1974:2, 1978:3, 1979:4, 1988:3 (Romer dates, taken from Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Evans (2000), p. 60). The vertical lines in Figure 1 mark the Romer dates. Under the
identifying assumption that rrt is strictly exogenous, the OLS estimates of ai, bi and ci consistently
estimate the IRF of TFP to a Romer shock. Eight lags (quarters) of tfpit and rrt are included to
capture the dynamics of the processes.
3.3 Fiscal Policy Shocks
The extent to which movements in scal variables reect current developments in the domestic
US economy depends on the denitions of the scal variables. For instance, while some transfer
expenditures are highly reactive to the state of the economy, innovations to defense spending
are generally thought of as exogenous shocks. This observation motivates treating defense related
variables separately from non-defense variables. Hence, we o¤er two methods to identify scal policy
shocks: the rst focuses on innovations to defense spending, and draws on Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992); the second addresses shocks to a broader measure of government spending (defense and non-
defense) and to a revenue variable, and follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002). While focusing on
military variables is certainly less demanding in terms of identifying restrictions, by using broader
spending measures we are likely to uncover scal policy shocks with larger real e¤ects. Nevertheless,
each of these two approaches provides an assessment of the robustness of the results obtained under
the other.
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3.3.1 Defense Spending
Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) identify a policy shock to their defense spending policy variable
as the residual in a regression of the form:
gt = z(t) + 
g
t
where t is the information set available to the scal authority when it sets its operating instrument
gt, and z is a linear policy rule. 
g
t is the policy shock, a serially uncorrelated residual, orthogonal
to the elements of t. Under these identifying assumptions, the IRF of a variable xt to a scal
policy shock gt is consistently estimated by regressing xt via OLS on current and lagged values of
gt .
3.3.2 Total Government Spending and Taxes
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) study the dynamic e¤ects of shocks to government spending and taxes
on output by means of a structural VAR that relies on institutional information about the tax and
transfer systems. The policy variables consist in one expenditure variable, total purchases of goods
and services (spending), and one revenue variable, total tax revenues minus transfers (taxes). In
the rst step we estimate the structural VAR and recover the policy shocks gt (spending) and 
t
t
(tax). Then, we consistently estimate the IRF of a variable xt to the scal policy shock 
y
t , y = g, t,
by regressing xt via OLS on current and lagged values of 
y
t . We also consider that contractionary
scal shocks may have di¤erent e¤ects from expansionary scal shocks.
3.4 Oil Shocks
Davis (1987) claims that allocative disturbances, such as oil price shocks, have more powerful real
e¤ects when they reinforce, rather than reverse, the direction of past disturbances. Davis and
Haltiwanger (1999) o¤er a specic oil price shock designed along these lines, and dene an oil price
shock index as the log of the following ratio: the current real oil price divided by a weighted average
of its observations in the prior 20 quarters, with weights that sum to one and decline linearly to
zero. Interestingly, the authors report that their result is especially important for samples that
extend beyond 1985, which further supports results found in Hamilton (1996). Since the TFP
series used in this paper start in 1972:2 and end in 1992:4, the concerns about the appropriate oil
price shock measure expressed in the above studies are of practical importance here, leading us to
adopt the Davis and Haltiwanger oil price shock index (oil index) as a measure of oil price shocks.
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A complementary strategy to identify oil price shocks has been followed by Hamilton (1985),
who adopts a narrative approach. Hamilton isolates a set of episodes (dates) marked by sharp
exogenous oil price increases. Hoover and Perez (1994) update Hamiltons work and identify ten
oil price shocks in total: {1947:4, 1953:2, 1956:2, 1957:1, 1969:1, 1970:4, 1974:1, 1978:1, 1979:3,
1981:1}. We use these dates and 1991:3 (to mark the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) to construct a
dummy variable that signals an oil price shock identied via the narrative approach (oil dummy or
Hamilton dates). The vertical lines in Figure 2 correspond to the Hamilton dates. Not surprisingly,
the Hamilton dates tend to coincide with the onset of prolonged increases in the oil price index.
Oil Price Index We estimate the IRFs of sectoral TFPs to an innovation to the oil price index
as follows: rst, we t an autoregressive process to the oil price index (opt), whose residuals are
dened as the innovations to the oil price index (eot ); second, we regress the log of sectoral TFP on
its own lagged values, current and lagged values of the oil index, and a deterministic trend. Finally,
we simulate the regressions to compute the IRFs of TFP to eot . To be specic, we estimate the
following equations via OLS equation by equation:
opt = ap;0 +
8X
j=1
ap;jopt j + eot
tfpit = ai;0 + ai;1  t+
8X
j=1
bi;jtfpi;t j +
8X
j=0
ci;jopt j + ei;t
Oil Dummy We estimate the following equation:
tfpit = i;0 + i;1  t+
8X
j=1
i;jodt j +
8X
j=1
i;jtfpi;t j + i;t
where odt is the oil dummy. Under the identifying assumption that odt is strictly exogenous, the
OLS estimates of the parameters  and  consistently estimate the IRF of TFP to an oil dummy
shock.
4 Results and Interpretations
4.1 Results
This section documents the e¤ects of the monetary, scal, and oil shocks on TFP for the 20 2-digit
US manufacturing industries considered. As we saw in sections 3 and 4, this study considers several
specications of TFP for each industry. To achieve a balance between ease of interpretation and
reection of the true importance of trying several TFP specications we focus on the following eight
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parameterizations of TFP: 'i, which relates to the importance of a procyclical labor utilization rate,
taking on values f0; 0:1; 0:2; 0:3g, and i=i, the markup-returns to scale ratio, which indexes for
imperfect competition-returns to scale, taking on values f1; 1:2g. In practice, and as a general
result, the greater 'i and/or i=i (loosely speaking, the greater the correction), the further away
from the unshocked path is the IRF of TFP for any shock. The discussion that follows is organized
by type of shock. For brevity, we focus on the typical industry and interesting exceptions. Finally,
and whenever appropriate, the IRFs correspond to shocks with a size of one standard deviation
and are measured as percentage deviations from the unshocked path.
Monetary Policy Shocks Part A.1 of Figure 3 displays selected IRFs of TFP and two standard-
errors-bands to a contractionary federal funds rate shock, when tight and easy shocks are assumed
to have symmetric e¤ects. Lets rst look at the typical industry, represented by the aggregate
manufacturing industry. The lines with circles are the IRFs of the di¤erent TFP specications
tried, and the solid lines the associated two standard-errors-bands. The clustering of the lines
indicates that the typical response of TFP is fairly small and insensitive to changes in 'i or in
i=i. There is a single noteworthy exception to this permissive pattern, displayed in Part A.2
of Figure 3: in Industry Machinery (SIC 35), TFP rises to level o¤ at the tenth quarter after the
shock (in the 2%-3% range, depending on the specication), and is accompanied by a transitory
decline in output (not reported), as predicted by the Opportunity Cost View. We get the same
results for a contractionary nonborrowed-reserves shock. Quite interestingly, Industry Machinery
(SIC 35) was again the only industry with a signicant, positive TFP response at longer horizons.
Note that in no industry does TFP decline after a contractionary shock, unlike learning-by-doing
or capital market imperfections theories suggest.
Part A of Figure 4 presents selected responses of TFP to tight and easy federal funds rate
shocks. Allowing for asymmetric e¤ects makes little di¤erence overall; responses to both tight
and easy shocks tend to be statistically insignicant (16-20 quarters). Interestingly, the responses
to tight shocks tend to be positive. The only agrant cases of asymmetries occur in Industry
Machinery and Equipment (SIC 35), where a tight shock leads to an increase in TFP, and an easy
shock has no noticeable e¤ect; and in Food and Kindred Products (SIC 20), where an easy shock
has negative productivity e¤ects, and a tight shock has no noticeable e¤ects. These asymmetries
are conrmed when we use F-tests for the presence of asymmetries in the TFP responses. Figure
7 displays the p-values of these tests. Each TFP specication has an associated p-value. A simple
way to summarize the multitude of tests per industry is to report the maximum and minimum
p-values over all specications. If both extremes are greater than  we fail to reject the null of
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symmetry at the  condence level for all specications considered. If the interval between the
maximum and minimum p-values contains the desired condence level, then we need to look deeper
at which specications led to which results before reaching a conclusion. Fortunately, the latter
situation occurred only twice, in Printing and Publishing (SIC 27) and Rubber Products (SIC 30).
Clearly, the picture that emerges from these tests is one of symmetry, with the above mentioned
exceptions of Industry Machinery and Equipment (SIC 35) and Food and Kindred Products (SIC
20). Finally, we obtain the same qualitative results with tight and easy non-borrowed reserves
shocks.
Part B of Figure 4 displays the typical response of TFP and output (the line with crosses) to a
Romer shock (estimation in log-levels). Now there are no signs of signicant productivity e¤ects.
The same results emerge with estimation in growth rates.
Fiscal Policy Shocks Part A of Figure 5 displays the IRFs of military spending and military
employment to an expansionary shock to military spending (mt ). Part B of Figure 5 presents
selected IRFs of TFP and output. Clearly, the TFP responses barely change across specications.
Most industries exhibit weak responses of TFP, regardless of the output response. However, in
Industry Petroleum and Coal Products (SIC 29) output (temporarily) decreases and TFP increases,
and in Instruments and Related Products (SIC 38), both output and TFP decrease.
Part C of Figure 5 looks at the e¤ects of an expansionary total spending shock, when tight
and easy shocks are assumed to have symmetric e¤ects. Food and Kindred Products (SIC 20) is
the only industry where the TFP response at 20 quarters after the shock is greater in absolute
value than two standard-errors, with an expansionary spending shock leading to a decline of TFP
of about -1.5%. Once more, changing the parametrization of TFP does not change the results in
any substantive way. Turning to the tax shock (tt), there is no evidence of signicant productivity
e¤ects in any industry.
Part D of Figure 5 presents the results for tight and easy spending shocks. In many industries, a
tight shock leads to an increase in TFP (16-20 quarters), although not greater than two standard-
errors. Again, tax shocks have no sizable e¤ects on TFP. The two bottom panels of Figure 7
document the ubiquitous absence of asymmetries for scal shocks. Chemicals and Allied Products
(SIC 28) and Rubber and Plastics (SIC 30) for spending shocks are the exceptions, as expected, in
light of their IRFs.
Oil Shocks The rst panel of Figure 6 displays the response of the oil price index to an own
shock. The other panels display selected responses of output and TFP (estimation in log-levels).
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The typical TFP response is one of virtually no impact response, followed by very mild changes
and quick reversion to zero. There is a single exception to this pattern: in Food Products (SIC 20),
TFP steadily rises up to 2%-3%, and is associated with a transitory decrease in output.
The results using the oil dummy are remarkably similar. In particular, the e¤ect in Food
Products (SIC 20) is again 2%-3%, and is accompanied by a transitory decline in output. However,
now Petroleum and Coal Products (SIC 29) shows a decline in TFP. On balance, the typical
industry shows virtually no response of TFP, with the clear exception being a positive e¤ect in
Food Products (SIC 20).
4.2 Interpretations
Summary of Results and Interpretations The variation in the results brought about by the
di¤erent specications of TFP is small. Ditto, the evidence speaks in favor of very small productivity
e¤ects of monetary, scal, and oil shocks. Table 2 contains the pairs of industries and shocks where
signicant TFP e¤ects (20 quarters after the shock) were found. The large majority of the cells
(read industries-shocks pairs) show contractionary shocks having positive productivity e¤ects, in
accordance with the Opportunity Cost View. Furthermore, in two other instances, expansionary
shocks have negative e¤ects, as predicted by a symmetric version of the Opportunity Cost View.
When do contractionary (expansionary) shocks have negative (positive) productivity e¤ects, as
predicted by learning-by-doing and capital market imperfections theories? Only Petroleum and
Coal Products (SIC 29) and Chemicals and Allied Products (SIC 28) show such a pattern (for
military spending and oil shocks, and total spending shocks, respectively). Table 2 also reveals the
presence of asymmetries, although in a localized manner. Note also that contractionary oil shocks
cause TFP to decline only in Petroleum and Coal Products (SIC 29).
Note that the identied shocks do help explain activity and hence are suitable for the quanti-
cation of the importance of the Opportunity Cost View and competing theories. Figure 8 displays
p-values of F-tests of exclusion of military purchases, oil price index, oil dummy, and Romer dummy
in univariate regressions models of sectoral industrial output, job creation, and job destruction (with
the last two series taken from Davis et al. (1996)). The variation in the results does not blur the
main point taken from Figure 8: the signal extracted with the identied shocks is in most cases
strong enough for our purposes. In addition, Figure 9 shows that in many instances the shocks
help explain the TFP indices.
The Role of Job Reallocation Aghion and Howitt (1998, Ch. 8) and Aghion and Saint-Paul
(1998) allude to the work by Hall (1991) as the rst formalization of the ideas embodied in the
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Opportunity Cost View. According to Hall: Measured output may be low during (downturn)
periods, but the time spent reorganizing pays o¤ in its contribution to future productivity.Hall
claims that there is relatively more reorganization going on during downturns than in upturns,
based on the fact job reallocation for the US manufacturing sector is countercyclical (Davis and
Haltiwanger (1992)). The countercyclicality of job reallocation is also mentioned by Aghion and
Saint-Paul (1998), and Aghion and Howitt (1998, Ch. 8) as evidence supportive of the Opportunity
Cost View. By the same token, Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 136) note in their macroeconomics
textbook that the large amount of job reallocation typical of downturns may be the silver lining
to the storm clouds of recessions.
Based on the above mentioned studies, we investigate the role of job reallocation as a channel
linking the considered shocks and productivity growth. If the contractionary shocks lead to higher
productivity growth but not to higher job reallocation, we interpret the evidence as speaking against
the empirical importance of job reallocation as a productivity improving activity. Conversely, if the
contractionary shocks lead to higher productivity and to higher job reallocation, we do not dismiss
the thesis that job reallocation may play a signicant role in the relationship between the shocks
and productivity change.
We use data described in Davis et al. (1996) to construct sectoral measures of job reallocation
and estimate the impact that the monetary, scal, and oil shocks have on job reallocation using the
methods employed in the estimation of the IRFs. Table 3 presents the cumulative responses of job
reallocation to contractionary monetary, scal, and oil shocks. In all six cases where Opportunity
Cost View e¤ects were found (see Table 2) the cumulative response of job reallocation is positive
at the twelfth period after the shock. Furthermore, the responses are substantially higher than the
response of the average industry. Taken at face value, these results suggest that job reallocation
may be at play and may help explain the observed Opportunity Cost View e¤ects.
The Role of the Real Interest Rate As discussed in the introduction, the smaller the increase
in the real interest rate, the more productivity should increase for a given transitory decline in
demand. Turning to an empirical application of this result, what is the evidence for the several
shocks considered? While it is agreed that transitory contractionary monetary shocks lead to
a transitory increase in the real interest rate (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2000)), the
empirical evidence on transitory contractionary spending shocks supports both temporary declines
in the real interest rate and no signicant e¤ects (Karayalçin (1999)). Now recall that four out of
the six Opportunity Cost View cases were found for contractionary spending shocks, which seems
to agree with the Opportunity Cost View. Of course, in light of the reduced number of signicant
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TFP responses, we should interpret these results as suggestive, but hardly denitive.
5 Final Remarks
The typical 2-digit SIC US manufacturing industry shows small productivity e¤ects in response
to monetary policy, scal policy, and oil shocks. However, there are exceptions to this pattern.
Interestingly, the exceptions are generally characterized by temporary contractionary policy shocks
having positive productivity e¤ects (16-20 quarters), suggesting that there is signicant investment
in productivity going on during transitory downturns. In addition, there are signs of asymmetries in
the responses of productivity, with productivity responses to contractionary policy shocks being, in
general, positive and larger than their counterparts to expansionary shocks. Overall, the evidence
lends very little support to learning-by-doing and capital market imperfections theories. These
results are robust to the alternative specications of TFP and identifying strategies employed in
the empirical framework, that take stock on the sate-of-art in the relevant literature. The data do
not dismiss the thesis that job reallocation and the real interest rate may be important channels
linking the considered shocks and productivity growth. As for policy implications, the data reveal
that contractionary policy shocks do not lead to declines in productivity both at the industry level
and at the aggregate manufacturing level.
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6 Appendix - Data
Unless otherwise mentioned, the data come from FRED. All data mentioned in this section, with
the exception of the labor shares series, are seasonally adjusted, and quarterly values correspond to
averages of underlying monthly data. The labor input series are the product of two (Citibase) series:
total hours worked by production workers (LPHR) and total number of production workers (LPP).
Growth rates of e¤ective capital services are assumed to equal growth rates of industrial electricity
consumption, measured as the kilowatts of electricity used at the 2-digit SIC level, obtained from
the Board of Governors. Manufacturing measures of output at the 2-digit SIC level were constructed
from the Board of Governors industrial production indices. Labor shares series were taken from
an updated version of the Jorgenson et al. (1987) dataset maintained by John Fernald. Since the
original labor shares are available at annual frequency, it is assumed that there is no variation in
these series within the year in order to obtain quarterly values. The values corresponding to the
years 1990-1992 are assumed to equal the values of the year 1989.
Industry Codes
20
SIC Code Industry Group
20 Food and Kindred Products Nondurable
21 Tobacco Products Nondurable
22 Textile Mill Production Nondurable
23 Apparel and Other Textiles Nondurable
24 Lumber and Wood Products Durable
25 Furniture and Fixtures Durable
26 Paper and Allied Products Nondurable
27 Printing and Publishing Nondurable
28 Chemicals and Allied Products Nondurable
29 Petroleum and Coal Products Nondurable
30 Rubber and Plastic Products Durable
31 Leather and Leather Products Nondurable
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass Products Durable
33 Primary Metals Durable
34 Fabricated Metals Durable
35 Industry Machinery and Equipment Durable
36 Electronics and Other Electrical Equipment Durable
37 Transportation Equipment Durable
38 Instruments and Related Products Durable
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries Durable
21
Industry Period 8 Period 12 Period 8 Period 12 Period 8 Period 12 Period 8 Period 12
20 -1.95 -2.91 -1.95 3.67 0.36 0.63 2.83 2.75
21 -1.28 -3.13 -1.28 3.40 2.48 2.52 -4.83 -5.22
22 0.04 -0.62 0.04 0.28 0.00 0.12 -1.17 -1.31
23 -0.34 -0.90 -0.34 -0.20 1.93 2.33 -2.75 -2.00
24 -0.32 -0.80 -0.32 2.18 0.02 0.49 5.51 6.36
25 -0.17 -0.68 -0.17 0.26 0.82 0.84 -0.76 0.69
26 -0.09 -0.78 -0.09 0.77 0.64 1.00 0.69 -0.18
27 0.08 -0.46 0.08 -0.15 0.65 0.77 -2.20 -1.99
28 -0.55 -0.83 -0.55 0.62 0.46 0.64 0.31 0.36
29 2.41 1.95 2.41 0.63 -1.42 -0.83 11.73 13.00
30 -0.02 -0.39 -0.02 1.77 0.03 0.52 3.22 3.12
31 -0.07 -1.08 -0.07 -1.25 -0.04 0.07 -0.48 -0.64
32 0.46 0.17 0.46 0.38 -0.94 -0.59 2.49 3.56
33 1.28 1.55 1.28 0.66 -1.84 -0.89 7.30 8.68
34 0.19 0.07 0.19 1.75 -0.18 0.24 4.94 5.62
35 0.51 0.72 0.51 0.12 -0.46 0.24 3.36 5.47
36 0.17 -0.31 0.17 0.44 0.04 0.22 0.06 1.03
37 1.27 1.20 1.27 4.08 0.28 1.37 15.29 12.88
38 -0.33 -0.81 -0.33 0.31 1.06 1.53 -0.71 0.02
39 -0.87 -2.00 -0.87 0.75 1.32 1.39 -3.14 -3.33
Average 0.02 -0.50 0.02 1.02 0.26 0.63 2.08 2.45
Comments:
Cells contain the cumulative response of job reallocation eight and twelve periods after the shocks.
Values are percentage deviations from unshocked path.
Except the Oil Dummy, shocks are of a size of one standard deviation.
Table 3
FFR Monetary Shock Total Spending Shock Military Spending Shock Oil Dummy
Cumulative Responses of Job Reallocation to (Contractionary) Shocks
Fig. 1--Monetary Policy Shocks and Romer Dates
o: Cover Approach FFR Shock, +:CEE Approach FFR Shock
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Fig. 2--Oil Price Index and Hamilton Dates
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Figure 3 Part A.1--Manufacturing Industry, Contractionary FFR Shock
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Figure 3 Part A.2--Industry Machinery, Contractionary FFR Shock
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Figure 3 Part B.1--Manufacturing Industry, Contractionary NBR Shock
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Figure 3 Part B.2--Industry Machinery, Contractionary NBR Shock
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Fig. 4.A--Manufacturing, Contractionary FFR Shock
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Fig. 4.A--Manufacturing, Expansionary FFR Shock
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Fig. 4.A--Machinery, Contractionary FFR Shock
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Fig. 4.A--Machinery, Expansionary FFR Shock
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Fig. 4.A--Food, Contractionary FFR Shock
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Fig. 4.A--Food, Expansionary FFR Shock
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Figure 4 Part B--Manufacturing Industry, Romer Dummy
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Figure 5 Part A--Military Variables, Military Spending Shock
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Figure 5 Part B--Manufacturing Industry, Military Spending Shock
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Figure 5 Part B--Petroleum and Coal, Military Spending Shock
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Figure 5 Part B--Instruments, Military Spending Shock
Periods After Shock
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
-.04
-.02
0
.02
.04
o: DRFs of Different TFP Specifications; -: Two Standard-Errors-Bands
Expansionary Total Spending Shock--Symmetric Framework
Fig. 5.C--Manufacturing, Expansionary Spending Shock
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Fig. 5.C--Food, Expansionary Spending Shock
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Fig. 5.C--Manufacturing, Contractionary Tax Shock
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Fig. 5.D--Manufacturing, Contractionary Spending Shock
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Fig. 5.D--Manufacturing, Contractionary Spending Shock
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Fig. 5.D--Textille, Contractionary Spending Shock
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Fig. 5.D--Textille, Contractionary Spending Shock
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Fig. 5.D--Chemicals, Contractionary Spending Shock
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Fig. 5.D--Chemicals, Contractionary Spending Shock
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Fig. 5.D--Rubber, Contractionary Spending Shock
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Fig. 5.D--Rubber, Contractionary Spending Shock
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Fig. 6--Manufacturing, Oil Price Index Shock
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Fig. 6--Food, Oil Price Index Shock
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Fig. 6--Petroleum, Oil Dummy Shock
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